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 The Honorable Thomas S. Ellis III, Senior District Judge for the United States*
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
RIGOBERTO WILSON-GARCIA,
                                                                    Appellant
_______________
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 06-cr-00055)
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 8, 2009
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS  District Judge.*
(Filed: February 6, 2009)
__________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
2Rigoberto Wilson-Garcia appeals from a judgment of conviction, arguing that the
District Court plainly erred in instructing the jury at his trial.  The threshold question
before us is whether, even assuming that the jury instructions were erroneous, the errors
were invited and thus nonreviewable where Wilson-Garcia’s proposed instructions were
the exact instructions that the District Court actually delivered to the jury, and Wilson-
Garcia specifically requested that the District Court give those instructions.  We conclude
that any error in this case was invited, and we will therefore affirm the District Court’s
judgment. 
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts.
On March 24, 2006, Wilson-Garcia, a prison inmate, was involved in an
altercation with a fellow inmate.  Several officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons tried
to break up the fight, ordering the inmates to stop and eventually physically restraining
them.  At some point during this altercation, Wilson-Garcia injured two of the officers
with a pair of scissors he was holding.  
On July 11, 2007, Wilson-Garcia was charged with two criminal counts (one for
each officer) of intentionally and unlawfully forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing,
impeding, intimidating, interfering, and inflicting bodily injury upon officers of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons while they were engaged in the performance of their duties, in
3violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b).  With the assistance of counsel, Wilson-
Garcia contested these charges and proceeded to trial.  
At trial, Wilson-Garcia argued that at the time he injured the officers, he was in a
fight for his life against a substantially larger inmate who was attacking him with a shank. 
He claimed that he was acting in self-defense and did not intend to injure the officers. 
After a two-day trial, the jury found Wilson-Garcia guilty of one count and acquitted him
of the other.  The District Court sentenced Wilson-Garcia to 150 months imprisonment
consecutive to another sentence he was serving, and imposed a $100 special assessment.
Wilson-Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Because Wilson-
Garcia is appealing from a final judgment of conviction, we have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984); Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
Generally, we “review jury instructions for abuse of discretion to determine
whether they are misleading or inadequate,” and we have plenary review over “whether
the instructions misstate the law.”  Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d
Cir. 1997).  Where the moving party failed to make a timely objection, however, we
review for plain error.  See Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 123-124 (3d
Cir. 1999).  The plain error determination is left to the sole discretion of this Court and
4this discretion should be exercised sparingly.  Id. at 123.  If the moving party establishes
that “(1) the court erred; (2) the error was obvious under the law at the time of review;
and (3) the error affected substantial rights,” then this Court may grant the moving party’s
motion.  United States v. Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409, 410 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).  We only
exercise our discretion to grant relief, however, “if the error affects the fairness, integrity
or public perception of the proceeding.”  Id.  Moreover, where a party invites the alleged
error, that error cannot support reversal.  United States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., 127
F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 1997).
III.
Wilson-Garcia contends that the District Court committed plain error when (1) it
failed to sua sponte alter the self-defense instruction that Wilson-Garcia requested to state
that self-defense was a complete defense to any conduct set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 111, not
just assault; and (2) it failed to sua sponte alter the (allegedly “flawed and confusing”)
intent instruction that Wilson-Garcia requested to state specifically that the Government
had to prove that Wilson-Garcia intended to cause bodily injury.  We conclude that if
there was any error at all, it was “invited error” that cannot now serve as a basis for
reversal.
In United States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., we held that an error in the jury
instructions was “invited error” that did not support reversal where defendants failed to
request the instruction that they asserted on appeal and where “their proposed instruction
 We have recognized an exception to the “invited error” doctrine “[w]here a1
defendant submits proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct
appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm.”  West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d at
305.  That situation is not presented in this case.
5
was remarkably similar to that actually delivered by the district court.”  127 F.3d at 306. 
Moreover, in 2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., we held that even
a “fundamental error” in jury instructions cannot serve as a basis for reversal where the
defendant failed to submit a correct instruction.  369 F.3d 732, 744 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting
that even “assuming that the instruction was wrong, it was tantamount to invited error”).  
The factual context here calls for application of the “invited error” doctrine.  In
fact, this case is easier than West Indies Transport and 2660 Woodely Road Joint Venture
because Wilson-Garcia’s proposed instructions were the exact instructions that the
District Court actually delivered to the jury, and Wilson-Garcia specifically requested that
the District Court give those instructions.  Wilson-Garcia cannot now complain of alleged
errors that he himself introduced.1
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.     
             
